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I. Research Background and Objective
□Background of the Research
〇One of the most remarkable trends in policy- making in Korea over the past two
decades is the move toward more inclusive and participatory decision- making
processes based on multiple stakeholders. During the period of authoritarian
government in the past, most decisions were made by a related government
department and a small number of policy communities. However, recently, issueoriented
decision- making networks are emerging. As they include participation
of multiple stakeholders, they ensure efficiency, effectiveness and democracy of
administration, and thus an advanced form of administration. Such a phenomenon
is even more encouraging in terms of governance, emerging as a core concept of
contemporary public administration since the mid- 1980s. Basically, governance is
a public management paradigm that emphasizes as core values participation and
collaboration, and governance proposes a variety of management skills to fulfill
efficiency, effectiveness and democracy in public administration.
〇The current issue- based decision-making networks observed in Korean administration
conform to the new governance paradigm. However, it should be noted that a
governance system, which is often suggested as a cure- all for contemporary
public administration, is subject to failure, just like 'market failure' in the 19th
century and 'government failure' in the 20th century. Many studies have
demonstrated the possibility of 'governance failure,' and provided diverse
diagnoses, which may be categorized in two types as discussed below.
□Objective of the Research
〇In this context, this study proposes to ① examine factors that affect the
accountability of collaborative governance and ② develop an accountability index
in order to prevent governance failure. To this end, this study examines Community
Centers in Korea as an empirical example case of collaborative governance. Adopted
in 1999, as of March 2008 (cf. statistical data from the Ministry of Public
Administration and Security), 2,621 Community Centers operate on the principle
of public- private collaboration that engages public agencies, local residents and
various social organizations to form a network and address local issues. This
accounts for 73.9% of a total of 3,547 local district offices in the country.
Implementation of Community Centers as collaborations can be interpreted as an
attempt actively to apply governance to the local administration system in Korea.
II. Main Research Questions and Analysis Results
□First, the structure of collaborative governance is relatively amorphous compared to
conventional bureaucracy. The reason stems from the inherent nature of collaborative
governance for decentralization of power and joint decision- making, as well as the
participation of multiple actors and their groups. In order to ensure accountability
for effective operation of a governance system ① legal and systematic device should
be clear enough to dissuade conflict as much as possible while promoting
collaboration. As neo- institutional supporters claim, law and regulations are social
mechanisms to pre- determine behavior and the interaction of all the involved
actors. ② It is necessary to examine whether representatives of particular interest
groups have sufficient expertise and whether their authority is acknowledged by
relevant groups. Participation of multiple stakeholders comes in the form of indirect
participation in a modern social structure; without official representatives, the
foundation of collaborative governance may be weakened. It is equally important to
ensure that these representatives have solid expertise in order to understand and
reflect local residents' needs and ideas.
□Second, collaborative governance is an interactive system and process based on the
principle of interdependence (Kim Seok-jun et al. 2002; Hong Seong-man 2004; Seo
Soon-tak, Min Bo-kyoung 2005). Presumably, accountability of collaborative
governance increases if ① the decision-making process is transparent ② the
decision-making process is democratic, and ③ communication is active to examine
and reflect local peoples' needs and demands, since they are primary consumers of
goods and services that collaborative governance produces. The fairer the process of
collecting opinions of multiple participants, the more collaborative the interaction
becomes to reach a shared goal.
□Third, the main mechanism of collaborative governance is mutual cooperation to
solve shared problems and to achieve a shared goal (Henton 2008: 3- 4), and it is
expected to provide prompt and more effective solution by reducing cost of decisionmaking
process (Park Jae- chang 2008: 123). That is, collaborative process and the
democratic nature of collaborative governance are not only for the sake of
democratic value and procedure, but also based on a belief that the outcome can be
more effective and efficient compared to vertical decision-making of conventional
bureaucracies. In discussing the accountability of collaborative governance, accountability
for outcomes (performance) emerges as a critical factor that can be facilitated by
designing and implementing ① performance management and ② a proper rewards
and incentive system for performance. This study also analyzed differences between
groups in the degree of perception of factors affecting the accountability of
collaborative governance derived through factor analyses.
□Analysis of differences between public and private groups
First, differences between public and private groups existed in three out of five
factors. Differences between the groups were found to exist in the clarity of laws and
regulations (factor 2) among accountabilities of the structure of collaboration and in
performance management (factor 4) among accountabilities of the outcomes of collaboration
(Table 10)
On the one hand, the public group perceives the accountability of the outcomes of
collaboration as more important compared to the private group. This may be because
the outcomes of collaboration are closely related to positive or negative incentives of
civil servants based on work performance. On the other hand, the private group
perceives the clarity of laws and regulations as a more important factor than the
outcomes (performances) of collaboration. Almost no institutional compensation is given
to the chairpersons or members of community councils in relation to the performance
of the current community centers. Therefore, it should be noted that the compensations
that can be pursued are intangible compensation, i.e., political compensations, such as
careers and reputations. The institutional compensations and motives that can be
pursued are clarifications of legal/institutional regulations. It would seem that they
ultimately pursue the expansion of the authority of community councils through this
mechanism.
□Analysis of differences between city and non- city groups
To analyze differences between areas in the degree of perception of factors affecting
the accountability of collaborative governance derived through factor analyses, the
questionnaire respondents were divided into two groups i.e., a city group (residing in
city or gu units) and a non- city group (residing in eup or myeon units), based on
places of residence. Independent sample t- tests were conducted. The results indicated
that differences between the two groups existed in three- out of five- affecting
factors. The differences between the groups were found to exist in the accountability
of the process of collaboration (factor 1) and in the outcomes of collaboration (factor
4 and 5).
III. Policy Recommendations
□First, the city group perceived the accountability of the outcomes of collaboration (factor
4, factor 5) to be more important than the non- city group, and the non- city group
perceived the accountability of the processes of collaboration (factor 1) to be more
important than the city group.
〇In general, city groups have larger populations, more diverse population
composition, and larger budgets compared to non- city groups. In addition,
exchanges between actors depend on formal decision- making processes with high
levels of institutionalization rather than informal contacts and emotional exchanges.
The city group, therefore, cannot but be more sensitive to the outputs of outcomes
that may involve diverse stakeholders compared to the non- city group, and it
appears that, for this reason, the city group perceives the accountability of the
outcomes of collaboration to be more important than the non- city group.
〇On the other hand, compared to the city group, the non- city group has a smaller
regional scope and is more likely to depend on emotional exchange structures
based on informal and face to face contacts rather than traditional exchange
methods, i.e., exchanges through the official system. Also, their budget sizes are
smaller. From this, the non- city group can be considered as regarding the
accountability of decision- making processes more importantly that the accountability
of direct performances.
□This observation suggests that, as in the case of public and private groups, which
must be distinguished to ensure the accountability of community centers, differentiated
measures to ensure accountability should be prepared for city groups as well as noncity
groups based on differences in perceptions. In particular, compensation and
motive systems linked with performance should be established for city groups, and
measures to ensure accountability relating to the decision- making processes and
overall collaboration processes are necessary for non- city groups.
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