year, title, edition, writer, read

Basic Research
Exploratory Research on an Accountability Index for Collaborative Governance focusing on cases of Community Centers in Korea
cover image
AreaReports
WriterEun, Jae Ho, Yang, Hyun Mo
IssueDate2009-12
read1569
Attach File 2009-24 Exploratory Research on an Accountability Index for Collaborative Gvernance Focusding on cases of Commmunity centers in Korea.pdf
I. Research Background and Objective □Background of the Research 〇One of the most remarkable trends in policy- making in Korea over the past two decades is the move toward more inclusive and participatory decision- making processes based on multiple stakeholders. During the period of authoritarian government in the past, most decisions were made by a related government department and a small number of policy communities. However, recently, issueoriented decision- making networks are emerging. As they include participation of multiple stakeholders, they ensure efficiency, effectiveness and democracy of administration, and thus an advanced form of administration. Such a phenomenon is even more encouraging in terms of governance, emerging as a core concept of contemporary public administration since the mid- 1980s. Basically, governance is a public management paradigm that emphasizes as core values participation and collaboration, and governance proposes a variety of management skills to fulfill efficiency, effectiveness and democracy in public administration. 〇The current issue- based decision-making networks observed in Korean administration conform to the new governance paradigm. However, it should be noted that a governance system, which is often suggested as a cure- all for contemporary public administration, is subject to failure, just like 'market failure' in the 19th century and 'government failure' in the 20th century. Many studies have demonstrated the possibility of 'governance failure,' and provided diverse diagnoses, which may be categorized in two types as discussed below. □Objective of the Research 〇In this context, this study proposes to ① examine factors that affect the accountability of collaborative governance and ② develop an accountability index in order to prevent governance failure. To this end, this study examines Community Centers in Korea as an empirical example case of collaborative governance. Adopted in 1999, as of March 2008 (cf. statistical data from the Ministry of Public Administration and Security), 2,621 Community Centers operate on the principle of public- private collaboration that engages public agencies, local residents and various social organizations to form a network and address local issues. This accounts for 73.9% of a total of 3,547 local district offices in the country. Implementation of Community Centers as collaborations can be interpreted as an attempt actively to apply governance to the local administration system in Korea. II. Main Research Questions and Analysis Results □First, the structure of collaborative governance is relatively amorphous compared to conventional bureaucracy. The reason stems from the inherent nature of collaborative governance for decentralization of power and joint decision- making, as well as the participation of multiple actors and their groups. In order to ensure accountability for effective operation of a governance system ① legal and systematic device should be clear enough to dissuade conflict as much as possible while promoting collaboration. As neo- institutional supporters claim, law and regulations are social mechanisms to pre- determine behavior and the interaction of all the involved actors. ② It is necessary to examine whether representatives of particular interest groups have sufficient expertise and whether their authority is acknowledged by relevant groups. Participation of multiple stakeholders comes in the form of indirect participation in a modern social structure; without official representatives, the foundation of collaborative governance may be weakened. It is equally important to ensure that these representatives have solid expertise in order to understand and reflect local residents' needs and ideas. □Second, collaborative governance is an interactive system and process based on the principle of interdependence (Kim Seok-jun et al. 2002; Hong Seong-man 2004; Seo Soon-tak, Min Bo-kyoung 2005). Presumably, accountability of collaborative governance increases if ① the decision-making process is transparent ② the decision-making process is democratic, and ③ communication is active to examine and reflect local peoples' needs and demands, since they are primary consumers of goods and services that collaborative governance produces. The fairer the process of collecting opinions of multiple participants, the more collaborative the interaction becomes to reach a shared goal. □Third, the main mechanism of collaborative governance is mutual cooperation to solve shared problems and to achieve a shared goal (Henton 2008: 3- 4), and it is expected to provide prompt and more effective solution by reducing cost of decisionmaking process (Park Jae- chang 2008: 123). That is, collaborative process and the democratic nature of collaborative governance are not only for the sake of democratic value and procedure, but also based on a belief that the outcome can be more effective and efficient compared to vertical decision-making of conventional bureaucracies. In discussing the accountability of collaborative governance, accountability for outcomes (performance) emerges as a critical factor that can be facilitated by designing and implementing ① performance management and ② a proper rewards and incentive system for performance. This study also analyzed differences between groups in the degree of perception of factors affecting the accountability of collaborative governance derived through factor analyses. □Analysis of differences between public and private groups First, differences between public and private groups existed in three out of five factors. Differences between the groups were found to exist in the clarity of laws and regulations (factor 2) among accountabilities of the structure of collaboration and in performance management (factor 4) among accountabilities of the outcomes of collaboration (Table 10) On the one hand, the public group perceives the accountability of the outcomes of collaboration as more important compared to the private group. This may be because the outcomes of collaboration are closely related to positive or negative incentives of civil servants based on work performance. On the other hand, the private group perceives the clarity of laws and regulations as a more important factor than the outcomes (performances) of collaboration. Almost no institutional compensation is given to the chairpersons or members of community councils in relation to the performance of the current community centers. Therefore, it should be noted that the compensations that can be pursued are intangible compensation, i.e., political compensations, such as careers and reputations. The institutional compensations and motives that can be pursued are clarifications of legal/institutional regulations. It would seem that they ultimately pursue the expansion of the authority of community councils through this mechanism. □Analysis of differences between city and non- city groups To analyze differences between areas in the degree of perception of factors affecting the accountability of collaborative governance derived through factor analyses, the questionnaire respondents were divided into two groups i.e., a city group (residing in city or gu units) and a non- city group (residing in eup or myeon units), based on places of residence. Independent sample t- tests were conducted. The results indicated that differences between the two groups existed in three- out of five- affecting factors. The differences between the groups were found to exist in the accountability of the process of collaboration (factor 1) and in the outcomes of collaboration (factor 4 and 5). III. Policy Recommendations □First, the city group perceived the accountability of the outcomes of collaboration (factor 4, factor 5) to be more important than the non- city group, and the non- city group perceived the accountability of the processes of collaboration (factor 1) to be more important than the city group. 〇In general, city groups have larger populations, more diverse population composition, and larger budgets compared to non- city groups. In addition, exchanges between actors depend on formal decision- making processes with high levels of institutionalization rather than informal contacts and emotional exchanges. The city group, therefore, cannot but be more sensitive to the outputs of outcomes that may involve diverse stakeholders compared to the non- city group, and it appears that, for this reason, the city group perceives the accountability of the outcomes of collaboration to be more important than the non- city group. 〇On the other hand, compared to the city group, the non- city group has a smaller regional scope and is more likely to depend on emotional exchange structures based on informal and face to face contacts rather than traditional exchange methods, i.e., exchanges through the official system. Also, their budget sizes are smaller. From this, the non- city group can be considered as regarding the accountability of decision- making processes more importantly that the accountability of direct performances. □This observation suggests that, as in the case of public and private groups, which must be distinguished to ensure the accountability of community centers, differentiated measures to ensure accountability should be prepared for city groups as well as noncity groups based on differences in perceptions. In particular, compensation and motive systems linked with performance should be established for city groups, and measures to ensure accountability relating to the decision- making processes and overall collaboration processes are necessary for non- city groups.